This paper considers some of the implications of the increase in UK unemployment since the beginning of the Great Recession. The major finding is that the sharp increase in unemployment and decrease in employment is largely concentrated on the young. This has occurred at a time when the size of the youth cohort is large. As a response to a lack of jobs there has been a substantial increase in applications to university, although there has only been a small rise in the number of places available. Further we find evidence that the unemployed have particularly low levels of well-being, are depressed, have low levels of life satisfaction, have difficulties paying their bills and are especially likely to be in financial difficulties.
Introduction
The UK economy went into recession during the second quarter of 2008 based both on declines in output and increases in unemployment. In this recession the labour market was not a lagging indicator. From peak to trough, real output fell by 6.4 per cent. By the second quarter of 2010 GDP had grown 1.9 per cent from the trough.
This was the most substantial shock to UK output since the Great Depression. Most developed countries also experienced significant reductions in output. It is therefore not surprising that this collapse has been termed the 'Great Recession'. It came about as a result of government inaction to correct long-standing economic imbalances and from a systematic misperception of risk by almost all actors in the financial sector.
It was inevitable that these events would have labour market consequences. In previous recessions, particularly that of the early 1980s, the UK labour market took a long time to recover from demand shocks. Yet the UK is now widely viewed as having a highly flexible labour market, at least in relation to other Western European economies. Hence one might expect that the impact of the Great Recession on employment, unemployment and other real labour market variables might be limited in both size and duration.
UK government policy over the course of the recession suggested, at least implicitly, an acceptance that labour market flexibility would play a major role in returning the labour market to equilibrium. Thus, unlike some other developed countries affected by the recession, such as the USA, the UK did not introduce a major countercyclical package of discretionary fiscal measures. And unlike countries such as Germany, it did not bring forward labour market policies specifically designed to moderate the effects of the recession on the labour market.
However, the increase in unemployment has been less than some commentators, including the authors of this paper, initially expected. In part this has been because firms have hoarded labour, cut hours and lowered pay. Nevertheless for some groups, particularly the young, its effects have been very negative. In this paper, we review some of the evidence on the increase in unemployment during the Great Recession and examine its effects.
This paper builds on a number of our earlier papers (Bell and Blanchflower, 2009a,b,c, 2010) which demonstrate that unemployment increases have been particularly concentrated on young people. We provide new microeconometric evidence from a number of surveys including the Labour Force Surveys and the Eurobarometers. We document the characteristics of the unemployed and how hard the young have been hit.
We consider the characteristics of the youth labour market. We first document the changes that have occurred in the UK over recent years, and in particular the growth in the unemployment rate of the young and the substantial rise in the size of the cohort. We then place these changes in international context, and show in particular how the ratio of youth to adult rates is very high in the UK compared to most other countries, developed and developing, in the world. Third, we show that youth labour markets are highly cyclically volatile. Fourth, we find that youths do not appear to have priced themselves out of jobs. Finally, we outline evidence that unemployment while young creates permanent scars.
Furthermore, we find evidence that the unemployed have particularly low levels of happiness, have a tendency to be depressed, have difficulties paying their bills and are especially likely to be in financial difficulties.
A particular worry going forward is that the recovery may be jobless as firms increase hours but do not raise their headcount. Fears about rising unemployment are likely to be exacerbated by the austerity package of public spending cuts and tax increases being implemented by the new coalition government. This is likely to increase unemployment significantly despite claims by the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) that unemployment will fall. We fundamentally disagree with the OBR's view that private sector job creation will be able to create 2.5 million jobs net, absorbing the public sector job loss and bringing down unemployment sharply. In contrast, NIESR is currently forecasting that unemployment will peak at 2.7 million in 2011. World growth appears to be slowing, the Baltic Dry Index has fallen 50 per cent since the middle of May 2010 as consumer confidence in the US, the UK and the Euro Area starts to slide. There are tough times ahead, and as a result the NIESR projection may be too low.
Section 2 reports the main labour market changes that occurred between 2008 and 2010. Section 3 provides details from the Labour Force Surveys on the characteristics of the new unemployed. Section 4 looks at the causes of unemployment while section 5 outlines the consequences. Section 6 examines the youth labour market. Section 7 presents new evidence on unemployment. Section 8 provides evidence on the impact of unemployment on health and wellbeing. Section 9 concludes.
Rising unemployment
We set the context by looking at the main changes that take place in the UK labour market between 2008 and early 2010. These are set out in table 1. A number of key developments are apparent:
• Employment fell by 580,000 between the beginning of 2008 and early 2010. Nevertheless, this was not as large a decline in employment as in the 1980s recession, when it fell by 1.6 million between November 1980 and May 1983. And in the recession of the early 1990s, employment fell by 1.7 million between May 1990 and February 1993.
• The decline in employment is more concentrated among men. Male employment has fallen by 3 per cent while that of women has only fallen by 0.7 per cent. The decline in male employment accounts for 84 per cent of the overall fall in employment. However, this is not uncharacteristic of UK recessions. Falling male employment accounted for 78 per cent of employment losses in the recession of the early 1980s, and 81 per cent of job reductions in the early 1990s recession.
• The young have also suffered disproportionately. Although they comprise only 19.5 per cent of the UK working age population, 74 per cent of the decline in employment has been among those aged 16 to 24. Consistent with the overall gender bias in job losses, males account for 44 per cent of the decline and females for 30 per cent. By contrast, employment increased by 173,000 among men and women over pension age.
• Data on redundancies show that at their peak, in 2009 Q1, the redundancy rate for those aged 16-24 was 17.7 per thousand workers, compared with 11.8 for the population as a whole. 1 Throughout the recession, redundancy rates among the young have exceeded those of other age groups.
• While full-time employment has declined, there have been offsetting increases in other forms of employment. Self-employment has increased by 91,000, while the number of temporary workers, who say they could not find permanent jobs, increased by 200,000. The number of part-time workers who say they cannot find full-time jobs increased by 400,000.
• Over the course of the Great Recession in the UK, the high, at 35.6 per cent for 16-17 year olds, and 17.1 per cent for 18-24 year olds. There has also been a marked drop in the employment to population rates (EPOP) of the young.
• The inactivity rate has risen, which implies a discouraged worker effect. In part this also reflects an increase in the number of students, but also an increase in the number of people who are inactive but 'want a job'. Table 2 puts the UK unemployment rates into international context.
• The UK unemployment rate of 7.8 per cent puts it in the middle of the pack. It is well below countries such unemployment rate rose from 5.2 per cent to 7.8 per cent. The number of unemployed increased by 857,000, exceeding the fall in employment by more than 200,000. This is due to people, particularly the young, moving from inactivity directly to unemployment.
• The unemployment rate of young people is extremely • Even though male rates are higher than female rates in the UK, this pattern is not repeated everywhere. In eleven countries female rates are higher than male rates (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain).
• Youth unemployment rates in the UK are especially high, particularly in relation to overall rates, with a ratio of youth to adult rates of 2.53. This is higher than the vast majority of countries, with the major exceptions being Belgium (2.77), Greece (2.68), Italy (3.36) and Sweden (2.94).
The concern is that unemployment will start to rise rapidly if this coalition government goes ahead with its misguided plans to cut public spending and raise taxes. More on that below.
What are the characteristics of the new unemployed?
Another key comparison with past recessions is how the incidence of unemployment is distributed across the population. Historically, the unemployed have been concentrated in particular regions or industries; it has fallen most heavily on particular groups in society such as the young, the old, those with a non-white ethnic background and those whose partner was not working. Are these patterns being repeated in this recession? Some trends are emerging in the claimant count unemployment data that are already worthy of comment.
Because recessions influence the components of demand differently, their effects are rarely uniform across industrial sectors. Thus, if investment falls more rapidly than other components of demand, the construction and investment goods industries are likely to be more affected than other sectors. Since industries are not uniformly distributed across the country, particular regions and localities will experience a more rapid rise in unemployment than elsewhere. In this section, we examine the incidence of unemployment categorised by age, region, ethnicity and household composition. It is apparent that unemployment rates decline with age, are higher among men, minorities and the least 
Causes of unemployment
The orthodox explanation of unemployment that argues that institutions matter (Layard et al., 2005; Nickell, 2006) has been subject to fairly extensive econometric testing and, in recent years, the validity of the empirical results supporting this view has been called into question. It has proved difficult to estimate a set of crosscountry panel unemployment regressions that contain a lagged unemployment rate and a full set of year and country dummies and show that any of the labour market rigidity variables work. This is the first main similarity between European labour markets; labour market institutions do not tend to cause unemployment.
The major exception is changes in the replacement rate, which, in some specifications, do appear to be negatively correlated with changes in the unemployment rate. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have argued that "the interaction of shocks and institutions does a good statistical job of fitting the evolution of unemployment both over time and across countries". This result is questionable because it is obtained in an over-fitted model -few data points and lots of variables -and the results appear to be driven by the cross-section variation rather than by any time series changes. There are only eight time series data points as they use five-year averages from 1960-95.
The increase in unemployment we have observed in the UK over the past year or so is not due to decreases in labour market flexibility. It is not that frictions in the market have increased; rather, there has been a collapse in the demand for labour as product demand has fallen, which in turn reflects severe credit rationing, falling consumer confidence, responses to transitory shocks in raw materials prices and delayed response by monetary authorities to these developments. None of these issues directly impinge on the labour market or on the extent to which institutional arrangements affect its efficiency.
The consequences of unemployment?
The major reasons cited in the literature for why we care about unemployment are as follows:
1) Because of the lost output involved. During a long period of unemployment, workers can lose their skills, causing a loss of human capital.
2) Unemployment is a stressful life event that makes people unhappy (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Ahn et al., 2004) .
3) Unemployment increases susceptibility to malnutrition, illness, mental stress, and loss of selfesteem, leading to depression (Linn et al., 1985; Frese and Mohr, 1987; Jackson and Warr, 1987; Banks and Jackson, 1982; Darity and Goldsmith, 1996; Goldsmith et al., 1996; Brenner and Mooney, 1983) . Goldsmith et al. (1996 Goldsmith et al. ( , 1997 found, for example, using data from the NLSY, that being jobless injures self-esteem and fosters feelings of externality and helplessness among youths. Moreover, they also found evidence that the psychological imprint of joblessness persists.
4) Increases in the unemployment rate tend to be associated with increases in the suicide rate (Platt, 1984; Pritchard, 1992; Blakeley et al., 2003; Hamermesh and Soss, 1974; Daly et al. 2008) . The unemployed appear to have a higher propensity to commit suicide. 5) Being unemployed can also reduce the life expectancy of workers (Brenner and Mooney, 1983; Moser et al., 1987 Moser et al., , 1990 ).
6) Unemployment increases the probability of poor physical health outcomes such as heart attacks in later life (Beale and Nethercott, 1987; Iverson and Sabroe 1988; Mattiasson et al., 1990) .
7) The long-term unemployed are at a particular disadvantage trying to find work (Machin and Manning, 1999) . The effects of unemployment appear to depend a lot on how long the person has been unemployed for. People's morale sinks as the duration of unemployment rises. Long-term unemployment is especially harmful. "The long-term unemployed have largely given up hope" (Layard, 1986, p.96 ).
8) Unemployment while young, especially of long duration, causes permanent scars rather than temporary blemishes (Ellwood, 1982) .
9) As unemployment rates increase, crime rates tend to rise, especially property crime. Thornberry and Christensen (1984) , for example, find evidence that a cycle develops whereby involvement in crime reduces subsequent employment prospects which then raises the likelihood of participating in crime. Fougere et al. (2006) find that increases in youth unemployment cause increases in burglaries, thefts and drug offences. Hansen and Machin (2002) find a statistically significant negative relationship between the number of offences reported by the police over a two-year period for property and vehicle crime and the proportion of workers paid beneath the minimum before its introduction. Hence, there are more crime reductions in areas that, initially, had more low wage workers.
Falk and Zweimuller (2005) find a significant positive relation between unemployment and right-wing criminal activities. Carmichael and Ward (2001) found in Great Britain that youth unemployment and adult unemployment are both significantly and positively related to burglary, theft, fraud and forgery and total crime rates. For each of these offence categories the relationship between youth unemployment and the specific crime was found to be somewhat stronger. Carmichael and Ward (2000) found that there is a systematic positive relationship between burglary rates and male unemployment regardless of age.
Unemployed people, it turns out, are more likely than other people to be the victims of crime. Unemployed people are more than twice as likely to be the victims of violent crime as employed people; they are also more at risk of burglary, theft from the person and at greater risk of vandalism and vehicle theft.
10)Increases in the unemployment rate lower the happiness of everyone, not just the unemployed. The fear of becoming unemployed in the future lowers a person's subjective wellbeing (Di Tella et al., 2001 Blanchflower, 2007; Knabe and Rätzel, 2008) .
We deal in more detail with a number of these issues below. In particular we look at the health and well-being of the unemployed and how increases in the aggregate unemployment rate lower national well-being. First, we re-examine the youth labour market.
More on the youth labour market
The majority of measured youth unemployment in the UK primarily relates to 18-24 year olds (the young) rather than to 16-17 year olds (the very young). For example, in March-May 2010 there were 216,000 unemployed 16 and 17 year olds compared with 707,000 18-24 year olds. There were 416,000 claimants in June 2010 who were 18-24 but none who were 16-17 as they are not eligible to claim unemployment benefits. The representation of youngsters under the age of twenty five among the unemployed is much greater than their representation in the overall population. 3
The unemployed ages 18-24 have occupied a rising share of overall unemployment since the turn of the millennium. As can be seen from A particular concern is also that youth unemployment rates are high for racial minorities. As we noted above, black unemployment rates ages 18-24 were 26.3 per cent and for Asians were 21.3 per cent. The rate for those without qualifications in the 2008 LFS was also high at 28.9 per cent and 47.4 per cent for young blacks, 30.0 per cent for young whites and 38.3 per cent for Asians respectively, without qualifications. We have special concerns regarding the employment prospects of these young people without qualifications -the disadvantaged young -going forward.
Part of the explanation for the rise in youth unemployment in the UK has been the recent rise in the size of the youth cohort. This is illustrated in table 9. who will drop out and will be replaced by 749,000 15 year olds (aged 12 in 2006) so the cohort will shrink by around 75,000. Analogously, it will drop by a similar number the next year.
Of particular concern is the high proportion of young people in the UK who are either not in education employment or training (NEET) or not in education and training (NET). In 2009 Q4 there were 895,000 of those aged 16-24 years classified as NEET (http:// www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STR/d000913/ NEETQBQ42009final.pdf). Low-skilled youths who become NEET find it more difficult to re-engage in employment and learning than 16-24 year olds on average and there is evidence that they may become trapped in NEET. Godfrey et al. (2002) estimated the costs of being NEET for the Department for Education and Skills. They considered social costs as well as public finance costs over the current, medium and long term. These included estimates of the costs of educational underachievement, unemployment, inactivity, crime and health. The authors were not able to make estimates of the costs of the lowering of the skills base and hence their findings may underestimate the full costs. Their major finding was that the 157,000 NEETs aged 16-18 present in the UK population in 1999 would accrue additional lifetime costs of around £7bn (2001 prices) in resource terms and £8.1bn in additional public spending. The per capita equivalents are £45,000 in resource costs and £52,000 in public finance costs.
It is also notable that the proportion of the young who are in full-time education has increased over time. This has increased from 26 per cent in 1993 to 38 per cent in 2007. It is apparent though that the proportion is still well below that of many other countries. It is also clear that working while in school is becoming a more important part of school-to-work transition than the traditional model of school, then work. Data available from the OECD suggest that the proportion of the young who are in school is considerably higher in, for example, Belgium (60 per cent); Finland (56 per cent); France (61 per cent), Italy (57 per cent); Luxembourg (69 per cent) and Sweden (57 per cent). One response to rising unemployment on the part of youth has been to return to full-time education (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Rice, 1999 On the one hand, they noted that the youth employment rate is 12 percentage points higher than in the OECD on average and long-term unemployment has decreased by over 7 percentage points over the past decade. The young in the UK are less likely to be in temporary work but more likely to be part time than in the OECD as a whole. Dropout rates continue to be below the OECD average. Low-paid employment is still common among youth but its persistence has halved since the early 1990s. On the other hand, the OECD report a number of problems related to youth labour market performance.
There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that the young, the least educated and especially minorities are hardest hit in a recession (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Freeman and Wise, 1982) . Youth unemployment rates continue to be more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment rate, as many studies have shown (OECD, 2008a) . Young unskilled men from minority groups are thus particularly hard hit. This is true around the world. Clark and Summers (1982) , in their classic study of the dynamics of youth joblessness, argue that the problem of teenage unemployment arises from a shortage of jobs. "Aggregate demand has a potent impact on the job prospects and market experience of teenagers" (1982, p. 230) . Freeman and Wise (1982) found in their study of youth joblessness in the 1970s that it was concentrated, by and large, among a small group who lacked work for extended periods of time. Over half of the male teenage unemployment they examined was among those who were out of work for over six months, a group constituting less than 10 per cent of the youth labor force and only 7 per cent of the youth population. The youths who make up the relatively small group that was chronically without work, Freeman and Wise reported had distinct characteristics. They were disproportionately black; disproportionately high school dropouts, and disproportionately residents of poor areas. Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified one basic pattern in the job market for young workers: the disproportionately large response of youth employment or unemployment to changes in overall unemployment. They argued that the sensitivity of youth employment and unemployment to the overall rate of unemployment dominate sizable demographic and structural changes favourable to youth in determining how youths fare in the job market. This was also confirmed in Blanchflower and Freeman (1996) and Makeham (1980) . Recently OECD (2008a) confirmed this conclusion; "Youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment rate and this high-sensitivity tends to decline progressively with age".
There is also evidence that young people do especially well in booms. Freeman and Rodgers (1999) analysed the 1990s boom in the United States and found that it substantially improved the position of non-college educated young men, especially young African Americans who are the most disadvantaged and troubled group in the US. Young men in tight labour markets experienced a substantial boost in both employment and earnings. Adult men had no gains and their earnings barely changed even in areas where unemployment rates were below 4 per cent. Youths did particularly well in areas that started the boom at lower jobless rates suggesting they would "benefit especially from consistent full employment" (Freeman and Rodgers, 1999, p.2) .
As unemployment amongst the young goes down and the attractiveness of work increases, because there are more jobs and better paying jobs out there, it becomes a virtuous cycle. Freeman and Rodgers found evidence that once that occurred in the US the crime rate dropped. Increase aggregate demand and youths, especially disadvantaged youths, seem to do best.
There has been considerable interest in the possibility that youths have priced themselves out of jobs. Wells (1983) Subsequently the relative earnings of youths have declined steadily. OECD (1986) found that from the 1970s through the early 1980s the earnings of youths fell relative to the earnings of adults in several countries. The finding that youths were overpriced relative to adults has not been replicated in subsequent periods, as youth relative wages have fallen steadily. Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) examined the relative earnings of youths aged 16-19 and 20-24 to those of adults in eleven OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and found that there were declines in the relative earnings of the young throughout the 1990s in each of these countries except Sweden, despite the fact that the size of the youth cohort was shrinking. O'Higgins (1997) also concluded that there was no close relationship between the relative wages of youths and their unemployment rates. "Indeed, the impression is that, more often than not, unemployment and relative wage rates appear to be moving in opposite directions to each other".
The finding that the relative pay of the young has continued to decline over the past decade or so is confirmed in table 10 using data from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings Such evidence there is that the high relative wages of the young are responsible for pricing them out of jobs comes only from the 1970s. Interestingly, that is the period of most rapid increase in union activity. Union membership peaked in the 1970s with union density -the proportion of workers who are members of trade unions -at a little over 50 per cent (Lindsay, 2003) . Since that time union membership numbers and density rates have fallen. In 2007 union density in Great Britain had fallen to 25 per cent. In the same year the union density rate for private sector employees fell to 15.9 per cent. Unions generally operate rates for the job, which would have the effect of raising the relative wages of the young, and hence making them relatively less attractive, and then lowering their employment. Union membership rates among the young in the UK are especially low. Blanchflower (2007) shows, using data from the Labour Force Survey, the union density rate for 16-19 year olds in 2004 was 4.3 per cent. In 2007 the union density rates for 16-24 year olds was 9.8 per cent (Mercer and Notley, 2008, Table 25 ). It does not appear that youths are pricing themselves out of work currently, unless their relative productivity is falling especially sharply, but we have no evidence to suggest that this is the case.
A further possibility is that the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, which was introduced in 1997, might have reduced employment of the young. There is little or no evidence to sustain that claim either (Metcalf, 2008; Dickens and Draca, 2005; Dickens and Manning, 2003; Stewart, 2002a Stewart, , b, 2004 . There is a little evidence to suggest that the influx of workers, who were generally working in less skilled jobs, from the ten Accession countries did have some negative impact in the period since 2004 on the employment of the least skilled young people (Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2009; Nickell and Saleheen, 2008) . But these effects are usually insignificant or, when significant, quite small.
In an important early contribution Ellwood (1982) examined the persistence and long-term impacts of early labour force experiences. The paper reports a rise in employment rates for a cohort of young men as they age, but points out that those persons with poor employment records early have comparatively poor records later. The paper found that the effects of a period without work do not end with that spell. A teenager who spends time out of work in one year will probably spend less time working in the next than he would have had he worked the entire year. Furthermore, the lost work experience Ellwood concluded was reflected in considerably lower wages. The reduced employment effects Ellwood examined appeared to die off very quickly. What appeared to persist were effects of lost work experience on wages.
More recently Mroz and Savage (2006) reached a similar conclusion using data from the NLSY for the US and also found evidence of long-lived blemishes from unemployment. A six month spell of unemployment at age 22 would result in an 8 per cent lower wage at 23 and even at ages 30 and 31 wages were 2-3 per cent lower than they otherwise would have been. Fairlie and Kletzer (1999) , also using data for the US, estimate that for young unemployed workers the costs of job loss in terms of annual earnings are 8.4 per cent and 13.0 per cent, for boys and girls, respectively. Gregg and Tominey (2005) found, using data from the NCDS for the UK, that there was a significant wage penalty of youth unemployment even after controlling for education, region and a wealth of family and personal characteristics. Their results suggested a scar from youth unemployment of 13-21 per cent age 41 although this penalty was lower at 9-11 per cent if individuals avoid repeat exposure. Gregg (2001) also used NCDS data to show that unemployment experience up to the age of 23 drives unemployment in subsequent years. Arulampalam (2001) found that joblessness leaves permanent scars on people and reduces both the probability of future employment and the level of future earnings and increases the risk of future unemployment. She found that a spell of unemployment carries a wage penalty of 6 per cent upon re-entry in Britain, with the penalty rising to 14 per cent after three years. Arulampalam et al. (2000) also found evidence of unemployment persistence, especially for young men.
Narendranathan and Elias (1993) also find evidence of state dependence and report that "the odds of becoming unemployed are 2.3 times higher for youths who were unemployed last year than for youths who were not unemployed" (p.183). Arulampalam et al. (2001) report that the best predictor of an individual's future risk of unemployment is his past history of unemployment. They find that unemployment has a scarring effect for both future unemployment and future earnings. In addition Burgess et al. (2003) find that unemployment while young raises the probability of subsequent unemployment, but the size of any effect varies by skill level. Bell and Blanchflower (2010) show, using data from the National Child Development Study to examine four outcomes in 2004/5 when the respondents were aged 46-47 years, a) life satisfaction b) self-reported health status and two for workers only c) job satisfaction and d) (log of) gross weekly wages in 2004/5 in NCDS7. The issue is whether a period of unemployment when young has lasting effects; it turns out that it does. Spells of unemployment before the respondent was 23 lowered life satisfaction, heath status, job satisfaction and wages over twenty years later.
There is new evidence that even youngsters who choose to go to college or university are hurt if they enter the labour market during a recession. Lisa Kahn (2010) has recently shown that the labour market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy have large, negative and persistent effects on wages. Lifetime earnings are substantially lower than they would have been if the graduate had entered the labour market in good times. Furthermore, cohorts who graduate in worse national economies tend to end up in lower-level occupations.
Work by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) suggests that the period of early adulthood (between 18 and 25) seems to be the age range during which people are more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. They found that being exposed to a recession before age 17 or after age 25 has no impact on beliefs about life chances. However, youngsters growing up during recessions tend to believe that success in life depends more on luck than on effort; they support more government redistribution, but have less confidence in public institutions. Recessions seem to affect adversely youngsters' beliefs.
There is also recent evidence on the consequences of rising unemployment on young people from the UK. The Prince's Trust, which was established by the Prince of Wales, conducted a survey of two thousand young people in December 2009. In comparison with other young people, the young unemployed were found to be significantly more likely to feel ashamed, rejected, lost, anxious, insecure, down and depressed, isolated and unloved. They were also significantly less happy with their health, friendships and family life than those in work or studying, much less confident of the future and more likely to say that they had turned to drugs, that they had nothing to look forward to and that their life had no direction. And many reported having suicidal thoughts (Blanchflower, 2010) .
Empirical estimates of the probability of being unemployed
We now turn to examine recent econometric evidence on unemployment in the UK. For purposes of comparison it makes sense to start out with the characteristics of the unemployed in previous recessions. Column 1 of table 12 is for 1984 and column 2 for 1993. In both cases the marginal rather than average effects from an estimated probit model are reported. The marginal effect is the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, reports the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. We are modelling the probability that a member of the labour force (unemployed or working) will be unemployed conditional on their characteristics. The probability of being unemployed was especially high, in both 1984 and 1993 among the young, men, blacks and Asians, the foreign born, the least educated and those living in Tyne and Wear and Merseyside. Regions with the lowest rates in all three years are the Rest of the South East, East Anglia and the South West. Those with the highest are Merseyside and the Northern region. The most notable difference is that the 2008 recession is increasing unemployment in London, with its dependence on the financial sector, as it did in 1993. The biggest difference is that unemployment in Scotland appears to be much less cyclically sensitive than in the past.
The impact of unemployment on health and wellbeing
In this section we review the evidence of the impact of unemployment on individual health and well-being. We also present econometric evidence of our own on the consequences of unemployment on health and well-being in the UK.
It is notable that the unemployed are especially likely to report having a mental illness, although it should be said that the direction of causation is unclear. For example, Asians and blacks, the least educated. It is also high for the disabled, and there is a specific effect raising unemployment in 2010. On this occasion the unemployment rate is highest in the West Midlands.
It is notable that the regional pattern of coefficients in 2009/2010 is similar to the prior recessions. The ranking, where the highest rate ranks first and the one in the Labour Force Surveys in 2010 Q1, 2.7 per cent of the unemployed reported their most important health problem, if they had one, was depression or bad nerves compared with 1 per cent of the employed.
There is a growing body of literature that suggests that the unemployed are especially unhappy (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004) . The evidence from around the world is that unemployment has not increased because the unemployed are lazy and have chosen not to work because benefits are too high. The reserve army of the unemployed is a conscript army rather than a volunteer army.
When unemployment rises, happiness of both workers and non-workers falls. Unemployment affects not only the mental well-being of those concerned, but also that of their families, colleagues, neighbours and others who are in direct or indirect contact with them. Jones and Fletcher (1993) , for example, provide evidence that the occupational stress and distress from unemployment can be transmitted between partners.
There is a body of literature that suggests individual well-being is related also to aggregate macroeconomic variables such as the unemployment rate, inflation, and the interest rate (Di Tella et al. 2001; Blanchflower 2007a ). This literature suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment reduces overall happiness twice as much as an equivalent 1 percentage point increase in inflation -the so-called misery index. Moreover, increases in aggregate unemployment seem indirectly to reduce the well-being of not just the unemployed but also that of the employed and those out of the labour force such as students, the retired and those looking after the home.
Di Tella et al. (2001) find that increases in the national unemployment rate have much larger effects on the happiness of the unemployed than they do for the employed, using the Eurobarometer life satisfaction data for twelve EU countries from 1975-92. This result, however, contrasts with the findings of Clark (2003) , using BHPS panel data for the UK, and Clark et al. (2008) using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. They argue that the well-being of the unemployed is less affected by unemployment if they live in a region with a high unemployment rate, thus narrowing the well-being gap between the employed and unemployed in such regions.
Blanchflower (2007) estimated a misery index of 1.62, which is the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment. Hence a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment lowers well-being by 1.62 times the impact of a 1 percentage point increase in inflation. Empirically it seems that people care more about unemployment than they do about inflation.
Interestingly Luechinger et al. (2008) also used the GSS data to show that the sensitivity of subjective well-being to fluctuations in unemployment rates is much lower among employees in the public sector than in the private sector. They found a similar result using individual panel data for Germany from the GSOEP 1984 GSOEP -2004 and repeated cross-sectional data for thirteen European countries from the Eurobarometers 1989-94. The fear of unemployment is, as expected, greater for workers in the private sector than in the public sector. This, the authors argue, suggests that "increased economic insecurity constitutes an important welfare loss associated with high general unemployment" (p.1).
In the Labour Force Surveys, individuals are asked about their health and which if any conditions impacted on them the most. One of these options was 'depression, bad nerves, or anxiety' which covers approximately 1 per cent of respondents. In table 15 we examine the probability an individual falls in this category, that is, we estimate unhappiness equations. In the first column we restrict ourselves only to the employed and examine measures of underemployment among workers which, as table 1 made clear, have risen sharply during this recession. We find that the underemployed, and especially those who say they are part-time because they could not find full-time work or that they would prefer more hours, have significantly higher probabilities of being depressed, and the effects are large.
There is a U-shaped pattern in age confirming results found by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) for 2004Q2-2007Q1 also using the LFS data. Citizens from the Strathclyde area of Scotland also have very high probabilities of being depressed, confirming earlier evidence in Bell and Blanchflower (2007) .
Column 2 now adds the unemployed to the sample and shows that individuals who are unemployed or on a government scheme are also likely to be depressed. Column 3 then separates the unemployed into two groups according to whether they have been unemployed for less than twelve months or for longer. It is apparent that both the short-term and long-term unemployed are especially likely to report being depressed, but with an effect for the long-term unemployed nearly twice the size as for the short-term. Unemployment is bad for an individual's mental health especially if that spell of unemployment is long. The worry then is that long spells of unemployment in particular will wound the individual's job and earnings prospects in the future. The patterns in the data are broadly similar -well-being is U-shaped in age, Bulgarians rank worst, Danes highest; married people are contented. Men are healthier. The unemployed report low levels of wellbeing whatever aspect is being modelled , whether it is family life, health or living standards. The UK ranks towards the top of EU countries. The significant and very large coefficient on the UK interaction in the health equation implies that the unemployed in the UK report being especially unhealthy. Unemployment appears to lower well-being, not only of the individuals who are unemployed, but also makes everyone else unhappy, although to a lesser degree. Unemployment hurts.
Conclusions
This paper has considered some of the implications of the increase in UK unemployment since the beginning of the Great Recession. The major finding is that the sharp increase in unemployment and decrease in employment is largely concentrated on the young. This has occurred at a time when the size of the youth cohort is large. The fact that the youth labour market tends to be highly cyclically volatile is a phenomenon that was well documented in earlier recessions (Freeman and Wise, 1982, and Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000) . As a response to a lack of jobs there has been a substantial increase in applications to university, although there has only been a small rise in the number of places available. Going forwards, a big concern is that the recovery will deliver few jobs. In part this may arise because of labour hoarding, which has prevented unemployment rising as much as most forecasters expected. Rather than firing people, firms responded by freezing or even cutting pay, reducing hours and instigating hiring moratoria. Unemployment has also been kept down by fiscal stimulus by the Labour government and measures to boost employment, especially among the young.
The new coalition government has reduced the number of university places, removed schemes to help the young find work and announced a series of public spending cuts and tax increases that are likely to result in a loss of at least 600,000 jobs in the public sector and perhaps as many as three quarters of a million lost in the private sector, because of its reliance on work from the public sector. Despite this the recently created Office of Budget Responsibility has astonishingly forecast that unemployment will fall every year through 2015 and total employment will rise by 1.3 million as shown in table 18.
This would imply that the private sector would have to create over 2.5 million jobs, which it has to do if it is to make up for the 1.3 million the new government plans to destroy. Job creation on this scale seems wildly unlikely given that between 2000 and 2008 the private sector only created 1.6 million jobs, mostly in the financial sector and construction. 4 It remains uncertain where all of these new jobs might come from. Firstly, with almost all G20 members tightening fiscal policy at the same time, it will be "hard to deliver on improving growth for all, or possibly any", as the chief economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill, has warned. Adding to that worry, O'Neill notes, is the growing evidence that both the US and Chinese economies are slowing. Second, it seems unlikely that people fired from the public sector, such as care assistants, police officers and local authority workers, can simply jump to jobs in the private sector. Occupational differences between any new jobs and job seekers will be a problem -a skills mismatch. Third, the chances are that most people who lose their jobs in the public sector will live in regions that are heavily dependent on the public sector, such as the north, while any new private sector jobs are likely to be in different regions, especially the south, where access to housing will be a problem -a regional mismatch. Fourth, any increase in jobs will lure back workers from Eastern Europe, who left Britain when job opportunities began to disappear. In such circumstances, measured employment will not rise as the OBR expects. Fifth, bank lending is still compromised especially among SMEs, which will restrict job opportunities still further.
The rise in unemployment that has happened during this Great Recession is unlikely to go away quickly. The worry is that it will get much worse before it gets better. Our fear is that the nearly one million jobless youngsters that currently exist will simply become a lost generation, which hurts everyone. Unemployment has devastating and long-lasting social and economic effects, especially on the young, and lowers national well-being and output. Reducing unemployment should be the new government's number one priority. Unfortunately it is not. That needs to change and quickly if the coalition is to survive. 
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